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Abstract 
 
This study sets out to discover the determinants of compensation of the chief 
executive officers in the banking industry of Pakistan. Accounting based performance 
measures and size of the firm have been used as predictors. Results of the study are 
consistent with arguments, suggesting significant and positive impact of size (assets) of the 
firm on CEO compensation while no association is found with either of the performance 
measure of the firm except income before tax (IBT). Return on Assets and Return on 
Equity failed to explain the given phenomenon. The study further elaborates that number of 
employees (NOEMP) greatly influences on CEO compensation but negatively. This 
relationship may be due to the unique characteristics of Pakistan's social and economic 
structure. 
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1.  Introduction 
It is a general perception that the compensation of chief executive officers is very high and in recent 
years considerable attention has been given to their rising pay levels. Corporate sector gives 
explanation for the rising trend in top executive pay over the past two decades or so, since shareholder 
value maximization became the objective of management.  Separation of ownership and management 
as discussed in detail by Jensen (1976) gives this idea that if management is compensated adequately, 
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expropriation of wealth will be less. Rules of the game are very simple. Agent’s performance is 
evaluated by various means and then compensated. Now the questions  arises that whether companies  
Board of Directors (BOD) are creating more value for shareholders in Pakistan  and  compensation 
received by them are justifying it? A thorough understanding of  the determinants of BOD  
compensation in financial sector of Pakistan  is critical for the development and growth of this sector 
as banking sector growth and development is important specially for developing economies where 
market oriented financial system is either at early stage or not  showing any progress to meet various 
business requirement.  
 
From Nationalization to Privatization in Pak Financial Sector 
The financial sector showed very poor performance during the period of 1972 to 1990 because of 
nationalization in 1970s and very poor governance culture which developed the heavy burden of 
nonperforming loans, the political pressures to grant loans to selected people, overstaffing and lack of 
interest of management in the overall performance of banks. 
In 1990s, Pakistan began the process of financial liberalization and government decided to 
privatize all nationalized banks, except National Bank of Pakistan. Rest of the banks were privatized 
and given to various private investors.   Now banks are not under bureaucratic control rather 
management of banks are facing competition from new local banks and international banks working in 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s banking system struggled to maintain viability in the 1990s.  The main goal of 
privatization was to achieve good governance; hence board of directors were concerned with the 
performance of banks.  Performance  can not only occur  by controlling  non performing loans but also 
of  overhead, managing risk and allocation of credit as per requirement of various economic sectors, 
and by following the policies of State Bank of Pakistan.  
In that situation financial sector was being reformed from top to bottom where they also had to 
concentrate on each and every aspect which caused problem.  When banks were nationalized, 
compensation of directors was also part of it. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) issued updated Prudential 
Regulations in 2011 for commercial banking, covering four categories i.e Risk Management, Corporate 
Governance, Customer Due Diligence and Anti Money Laundering, and Operations. 
Now, some of the major families in Pakistan have banks other than manufacturing companies. 
They transfer CEOs from one company to another or one company to bank. This study is an effort to 
find out whether compensation of these CEOs is based on bank performance. Acceptance of this 
hypothesis will lead to a conclusion that compensation is not based on political or any other reason. 
 
 
2.  Prior Research 
A lot of research has been done to explore the determinants of executives’ compensation. In most of 
the studies, measures of performance and size of the firm have been used to determine the CEO 
compensation (Nourayi and Daroca, 2008; Hill and Phan, 1991; Ciscel, 1974; Agrawal, Makhija, and 
Mandelker, 1991; Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum, 1992; Barros and Nunes, 2007; Conyon, 
Gregg, and Machin, 1974). 
Majority of the studies, conducted on executives’ compensation, evaluated significant and 
positive relationship between CEO compensation and size of the firm (Nourayi and Mintz, 2008; Firth, 
Lohne, Ropstad, and Sjo, 1996; Ueng, Wells, and Lilly, 2000; Hill and Phan, 1991; McGuire, Chiu, 
and Elbing, 1962; Canarella and Gasparyan, 1992; Sigler, 2003). When it comes to pay-performance 
relationship, few studies have established a significant positive connection (Murphy, 1985; Lewellen 
and Huntsman, 1970; Hogan and Sigler, 1998). However, some of the studies have described that the 
connection between executives’ compensation and performance of the firm is either non-existent or 
extremely weak (McGuire et al., 1962; Cosh, 1975; Leonard, 1990; Main and Johnston, 1993; Meeks 
and Whittington, 1975). This study aims to investigate the impact of size and performance of the firm 
on Chief executive officer Compensation in case of banking sector of Pakistan.  
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Considerable attention has been given to high and rising pay levels of chief executive officers. 
Critics argue that the compensation of chief executive officers is very high and it reduces the value 
creation of stock holders who are actual owners of the firm. Critics believe that compensation level 
should be in accordance with the performance of the firm and senior executives pay level should be set 
in a way that motivates them to make strategies that are in the best interest of shareholders. Therefore, 
there is a need of precise relationship between chief executive officers compensation and those 
variables that play a significant role in determining the executive compensation.  
As mentioned above, abundant research has been carried out to find out the determinants of 
chief executive officers compensation but there is a lack of precise investigation to analyze the 
determinants of chief executive officers in Pakistan. In this connection, the objective of this research is 
to find out the determinants of chief executive officer compensation in banking industry of Pakistan. 
The study uses accounting based measures such as return on assets, return on equity, Profit Margin and 
Income before tax along with measures of size (assets and number of employees) as predictors of CEO 
compensation (Cash based). 
Nourayi and Mintz (2008) investigated the association between performance of the firm, CEO 
compensation and their tenure. They also examined relationship between pay and performance for 
CEOs serving in their last year as CEO and those who have just taken charge and are in their first year 
as CEOs in the firm. Two measures of compensation were used in their study as dependant variables 
that were cash compensation and total compensation. Logarithm of sales was used as measure for firm 
size. Two measures of performance were used first was accounting based measures such as return on 
assets and return on equity and second was market based measures such as share holders return. Log 
transformation of general model was used to reduce the problem of heteroscedasticity. Final sample of 
2601 observations from 1416 firms was taken. Findings indicate that pay of less experienced chief 
executive officers was more influenced by the performance of the firm. It was also found that behavior 
of total compensation and cash compensation was quiet different to the measures of the performance 
which showed that performance of firm and cash compensation were positively correlated while 
performance of the firm was negatively correlated to total compensation. Size of the firm was found to 
be significant explanatory variable for total and cash compensation despite of chief executive officer’s 
tenure and firm performance. 
Ueng, Wells, and Lilly (2000) disclosed the impact of the CEO influence above the board of 
directors on CEO compensation for both big and small firms. Sample of small firms was taken from 
compact disclosure and big firms from fortune 500 companies. Chief executive officer compensation 
incorporated both salary and bonus. Sample size of large firms was 468 while the sample size of small 
firms was 424. Small firms were explained which had assets of less than $250 million. Simple linear 
regression technique was used to test hypotheses. Logarithm of Compensation (log COMP) was used 
as dependant variable while firm size, growth rate; performance and CEO influence over the board 
were taken as independent variables. 
Results of the study revealed that CEO pay was significantly and positively related with firm 
size for small firms, remaining variables in small firms were failed to explain CEO compensation. 
CEO influence had no significant relationship with CEO compensation for small firms. In large firms, 
it was totally different i.e. CEO influence had positive impact on CEO compensation. Sales growth rate 
was found insignificant. Firm performance, measured by return on assets, showed significance 
relationship with Chief Executive Officer Compensation for large firms; firm size was also significant 
and positively and strongly related with CEO compensation. 
Main (1991) accomplished a study which explored the relationship between shareholders 
wealth and CEO compensation with additional independent variables such as number of employees, 
pay to assets and turnover of the firm. Sample of two hundred and forty one (241) largest industrial 
firms was taken for the study and simple linear regression technique was used to find out results. 
Finding of the study indicated no evidence of correlation between compensation and firm size; sales 
turnover had the same behavior as of assets in determining CEO compensation (No relationship). 
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Number of employees also revealed the same results. Finally, shareholders return had significant link 
to the chief executive officers compensation. 
Ciscel (1974) conducted the study to investigate the relationship between pay and performance 
of CEO compensation with five predictors such as size, sales revenue, growth, managerial concern and 
assets of the firm. Sample of two hundred and fifty (250) largest industrial companies were taken for 
this study and simple linear regression technique was used. Results revealed that executive 
compensation had strong and consistent relationship with return (market value of common stock), but 
sales had modest impact on chief executive officer compensation. Assets and sales were not 
considerably dissimilar from the correlations with net profits for the CEO reward of the senior officer. 
The number of human resources did not show strong impact on CEO compensation. There was also no 
positive relationship between CEO pay or compensation and tenure of the chief executive officer. 
 
 
3.  The Determinants of Chief Executive Officers’ Compensation 
Abundant research has been performed to find out the determinants of chief executive officers 
compensation but there is a lack of precise investigation to examine its determinants in Pakistan. For 
board of directors, it is necessary as part of banking regulation that they must have management 
experience of at least five years at senior level and must be familiar with the banking field. Minimum 
qualification is graduation but added qualification if banking and finance is preferred. For chief 
executive officers at least fifteen years of banking experience is required and work experience at senior 
level in banking sector either in Pakistan or abroad. As per banking regulations in Pakistan, the 
remuneration of a director or chairman is determined by the Board of Directors in the annual general 
meeting in accordance with the provisions in the company’s articles. A comprehensive understanding 
of internal compensation system is vital to the development of organization as well as to understand the 
behavior of individual, working in decision making capacity. The objective of this research is to 
investigate the determinants of chief executive officer compensation in banking industry of Pakistan 
The data was obtained from published audited annual reports of the banks listed on Karachi 
stock exchange during 2000 to 2009. Cash Compensation of chief executive officer, Assets, Number of 
employees and Income before tax are available in the annual reports while return on assets, profit 
margin and return on equity were calculated based on the data available. 
Most of the previous studies have been done by using the data of different industries together 
but this study aims to focus only on one industry i.e. banking sector of Pakistan. All the banks have 
been included in the sample whose data is available. Total sample of 128 observations was used in this 
study. 
Empirical investigation tell us that total asset of the firm (TOTAST), number of employees 
(NOEMP), return of assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), profit margin (PM) and income before tax 
(IBT) affect the compensation of chief executive officer (CCOMP). In this research we are interested 
to find which variables are affecting CEO compensation after liberalization of financial sector in 
Pakistan. 
Due to multicollinearity between sales (Interest income) and assets only one of them is taken. 
Total assets of the firm (TOTAST) along with number of employees (NOEMP) are taken as measures 
of firm’s size, which have also been taken as measure of firm size in previous studies (Main, 1991; 
Nourayi and Daroca, 2008).  
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) have been used broadly as accounting 
based measures of performance of the firm in previous studies conducted on executive compensation 
(Canarella and Gasparyan, 1992; Duru and Iyenger, 1999; Hogan and Sigler, 1998; Nourayi and Mintz, 
2008; Tai, 2008; Firth et al, 1996; Sigler, 2003; Nourayi and Daroca, 2008; Lewellen et al, 1992; Jiang 
et al, 2009; Ely, 1991). Another two accounting based measures of the performance of the firm are 
profit margin (PM) which is calculated as Net Income before tax divided by total interest income and 
Income before tax (IBT) which is taken as annual income before tax in millions of Pak rupees. 
Description of variables is given in table 1. 
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Table 1: Description of the Variables 
 
Sr. No. Variables Description 
1 CCOMP Compensation of Chief Executive Officer which includes salary, perks and special benefits) 
2 TOTAST Total assets of the firm 
3 NOEMP Total number of temporary and permanent staff except outsourced employees 
4 IBT Income before tax in Pak rupees 
5 ROA Return of Assets, calculated as net income after tax divided by total assets 
6 ROE Return on Equity, calculated as net income after tax divided by total equity 
7 PM Profit Margin, calculated as net income before tax divided by total interest income 
 
This study argues that there is a significant relationship between size of the firm and CEO 
compensation. This study also investigates the relationship between CEO pay and accounting based 
performance of the firm and argues that accounting based performance of the firm and CEO 
compensation have no relationship.  
CCOMP = α + β1 (Assets) + β2 (Employees) + β3 (ROA) + β4 (ROE) + β5 (IBT) + β6 (PM) + e (Model 1) 
The model was estimated through the pooled data of annual audited accounts of all banks listed 
on Karachi Stock Exchange during 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CCOMP 128 3.2 112.16 25.062 23.675 
TOTAST 128 4.03 944.23 176.251 192.449 
NOEMP 128 152 18536 4086.796 4336.600 
IBT 128 -16858.34 28061 3636.138 6841.114 
ROA 128 -9.18 4.95 0.730390 2.147 
ROE 128 -276.25 79.08 11.05859 37.349 
PM 128 -1.76 0.87 0.161015 0.4195 
Valid N (list wise) 128 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependant variables and 
predictors of the sampled companies. Cash compensation (CCOMP) has the mean value of 25.06, 
suggesting that the average annual cash compensation of chief executive officers in banking sector of 
Pakistan is 25 millions. The table shows huge difference between minimum and maximum cash 
compensation paid to CEO.  
The Table 2 describes that average total assets (TOTAST) of the banks are 176 million Pak 
rupees in which the minimum value is only 4 million while maximum is 944 in Pak rupees. It indicates 
that all the banks in Pakistan are not of equal size. Same is the case with number of employees 
(NOEMP) having an average of 4087. This table also suggests that all the banks operating in Pakistan 
are not profitable as minimum value of income before tax shows an annual loss of 16.8 billion rupees. 
Due to negative income before tax for some banks same is the behavior of return on assets, profit 
margin and return on equity. 
Table 3 shows the correlation between executive cash compensations and all predicting 
variables, showing that there is a positive and moderate correlation between cash compensation and 
total assets (TOTAST) of the firm (42.3%). Correlation between number of employees (NOEMP) and 
cash compensation is weak. Income before tax (IBT) is also positively correlated to cash compensation 
however the correlation is weak, showing correlation coefficient of 25.9%. The table further elaborates 
that no significant correlation exists between cash compensation of chief executive officer and 
accounting based performance measures of the firms. Significant and strong relationship has been 
found between total assets of the firm and number of employees of the firm as it was expected showing 
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correlation coefficient of 91.2% which explains that number of employees increases with the increase 
in total assets of the firm. Size of the firm (Assets) and income before tax are also significantly and 
positively correlated to each other showing strong correlation coefficient of 84.2%, that means the 
banks bigger in size in terms of total assets record higher after tax profits than the banks smaller in 
size.   
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
CComp Assets Employees IBT ROA ROE PM 
Pearson Correlation CCOMP 1 0.423 0.200 0.259 0.019 -0.042 -0.030 
TOTAST 1 0.912 0.842 0.318 0.230 0.352 
NOEMP 1 0.767 0.284 0.241 0.358 
IBT 1 0.517 0.445 0.520 
ROA 1 0.712 0.867 
ROE 1 0.646 
PM 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) CCOMP . 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.415 0.318 0.367 
TOTAST . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 
NOEMP . 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 
IBT . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA . 0.000 0.000 
ROE . 0.000 
PM . 
N CCOMP 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
 
The results in table 4 show that both assets and number of employees are significant variables. 
However the standardized coefficient of assets (0.205) and t statistics (7.98) is higher than all the other 
variables indicating that total assets is the major contributor in the model. It means CEO compensation 
in banking industry of Pakistan is very much dependant on total assets of the bank. Number of 
employees also significantly contributes to the model; however its contribution is less than the total 
assets. Negative coefficient of employees suggests that compensation of CEO will decrease with the 
increase in number of employees which is quiet surprising. This relationship may be due to the unique 
characteristics of Pakistan's social and economic structure So, significance of the assets and number of 
employees point out that size of the firm has significant impact on the cash compensation of CEO in 
the banking industry in Pakistan. 
Initially there were six determinants, including accounting based variables. Out of all other 
variables, only Income before tax (IBT) is found to be significant at 10 percent. The results of 
insignificant variables are not reported here. 
 
Table 4: Predicting the Cash Compensation of Chief Executive Officers 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error 
Intercept 17.51** 2.436 (7.04) 
TOTAST 0.205** 0.026 (7.988) 
NOEMP -0.006** 0.001 (-6.199) 
IBT -0.001* 0.001 (-1.868) 
No. of observations 128  Adjusted R2 0.394 
**, * Significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively 
t statistics are in parenthesis . 
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5.  Conclusion 
This study aims to investigate the significant impact of size and performance of the firm on Chief 
executive officer Compensation. For this purpose accounting based measures such as return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), Income before (ITB), Profit margin (PM) are used as performance 
measures of the firm, while total assets (TOTAST) and number of employees (NOEMP) are used as 
measures of size of the firm. Both size and performance measures are used as independent variables 
using linear regression model. CEO cash compensation (including base salary, bonus, perks and special 
benefits) has been used as dependent variable. 
Findings of the study revealed that there is a significant and positive correlation between total 
assets of the firm and CEO cash compensation and no significant correlation was found between 
number of employees and cash compensation of chief executive officer. Income before tax was also 
positively correlated to chief executive officer cash compensation. Significant and strong relationship 
has also been found between total assets of the firm and number of employees of the firm showing that 
number of employees increases with the increase in total assets of the firm.  
Study further elaborated that total assets was the major contributor in the model which means 
chief executive officer compensation in banking industry of Pakistan is very much dependant on total 
assets of the firm having significant and positive impact. 
Surprisingly, negative impact of number of employees was found on the CEO cash 
compensation, suggesting that CEO compensation decreases as the number of employees’ increases. 
Significance of the assets and number of employees pointed out that size of the firm has significant 
impact on the cash compensation of CEO in the banking industry of Pakistan.  
 
 
References 
[1] Agrawal, A., Makhija, A. K., & Mandelker, G. N. (1991). Executive Compensation and 
Corporate Performance in Electric and Gas Utilities. Financial Management, 20, 113-124. 
[2] Barros, C. P., & Nunes, F. (2007). Governance and CEO pay and performance in non-profit 
organizations. International Journal of Social Economics, 34, 811-827. 
[3] Bhattacharyya, N., Mawani, A., & Morrill, C. K. J. (2008). Dividend payout and executive 
compensation: theory and Canadian evidence. Managerial Finance, 34, 585-601. 
[4] Canarella, G., & Gasparyan, A. (2008). New insights into executive compensation and firm 
performance. Managerial Finance, 34, 537-554. 
[5] Carpenter, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. (2002). Top Management Team Compensation: The 
Missing Link between CEO Pay and Firm Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 
367-375. 
[6] Ciscel, D. H. (1974). Determinants of Executive Compensation. Southern Economic Journal, 
40, 613-617. 
[7] Conyon, M., Gregg, P., & Machin, S.  (1995). Taking Care of Business: Executive 
Compensation in the United Kingdom. The Economic Journal, 105, 704-714. 
[8] Cosh, A. (1975). The Remuneration of Chief Executives in the United Kingdom. The 
Economic Journal, 85, 75-94. 
[9] Duru, A. I., & Iyengar, R. J. (1999). Linking CEO Pay to Firm Performance: Empirical 
Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry. Managerial Finance, 25, 21-33. 
[10] Ely, K. M. (1991). Interindustry Differences in the Relation between Compensation and Firm 
Performance Variables. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 37-58. 
[11] Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political 
economy, 88, 288-307. 
[12] Firth, M., Lohne, J. C., Ropstad R., & Sjo, J. (1996). The Remuneration of CEOs and Corporate 
Financial Performance in Norway. Managerial and Decision Economics, 17, 291-301. 
[13] Hill, C. W. L., & Phan, P. (1991). CEO Tenure as a Determinant of CEO Pay. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 34, 707-717. 
CEO Compensation and Bank Performance 100 
[14] Hogan, S., & Sigler, K. (1998). The CEO Pay-Performance Relationship: Pooled Vs. Industry 
Models. Managerial Finance, 24, 59-77. 
[15] Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economic, 48, 305-360. 
[16] Jiang, H., Habib, A., & Smallman, C. (2009). The effect of ownership concentration on CEO 
compensation-firm performance relationship in New Zealand. Pacific Accounting Review, 21, 
104-131. 
[17] Leonard, J. S. (1990). Executive Pay and Firm Performance. Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 43, 13S-29S. 
[18] Lewellen, W. G., & Huntsman, B. (1970).S Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance. The 
American Economic Review, 60, 710-720. 
[19] Lewellen, W., Loderer, C., Martin, K., & Blum, G. (1992). Executive Compensation and the 
Performance of the Firm. Managerial and Decision Economics, 13, 65-74. 
[20] Main, B. G. M. (1991). Top Executive Pay and Performance. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 12, 219-229. 
[21] Main, B. G. M., & Johnston, J. (1993). Remuneration committees and corporate governance. 
Accounting and Business Research, 23, 351-62. 
[22] McGuire, J.W., Chiu J. S. Y., & Elbing, A. O. (1962). Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits. 
The American Economic Review, 52, 753-761. 
[23] Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive Compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485-2563. 
[24] Murphy, K.J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 7, 11-42. 
[25] Nourayi, M. M., & Daroca, F.P. (2008). CEO compensation, firm performance and operational 
characteristics. Managerial Finance, 34, 562-584. 
[26] Nourayi, M. M., & Mintz, S. M. (2008). Tenure, firm’s performance, and CEO’s compensation. 
Managerial finance, 34, 524-536. 
[27] Pearce, J., & Robinson, R. (2008). Formulation, Implementation and Control of Competitive 
Strategy. McGraw Hill. 
[28] Sigler, K.J. (2003). CEO Compensation and Healthcare Organisation Performance. 
Management Research News, 26, 31-38. 
[29] Tai, L. S. (2008).Synchronous and lagged relationships between CEO pay and performance of 
quality companies. Managerial Finance, 34, 555-561. 
[30] Ueng, C. J., Wells, D. W., & Lilly, J. D. (2000). CEO Influence and Executive Compensation: 
Large Firms vs. Small Firms. Managerial Finance, 26, 3-12. 
 
 
